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ACCOUNTANTS LIABILITY
IN THE 1990’S
By Dan L. Goldwasser
Vedder, Price, Kaufman,
Kammholz & Day
New York
RECENT COURT DECISIONS
Although the number and severity of claims against certified
public accountants increased significantly in the mid - 1980’s, there
have been no revolutionary changes in the law. In fact, given the
percentage of attorneys serving in the House (40%) and Senate
(60%), tort reforms of any magnitude are remote. Most of the legal
decisions dealing with accountants in recent years have generally
involved minor interpretations to well recognized legal doctrines.
For that reason, practitioners should be sure to be familiar with the
principles handed down in relevant cases.

Decisions Regarding the Privity Doctrine
In 1931, in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Chief Judge Cardozo,
writing for the New York Court of Appeals, ruled that an accountant
may only be held liable on a negligence claim to those persons with
whom the accountant was in contractual privity; all other persons
aggrieved by the accountant’s malfeasance are required to assert their
claims on a fraud theory. This ruling was premised on the notion that
accountants should not be held liable for an indeterminate amount to
an indeterminate number of persons by reasons of a mere “slip or
blunder.”

This ruling (commonly referred to as the
“privity” doctrine) soon became the standard for
dealing with malpractice claims against accoun
tants in virtually all states. It was not until the late
1950s that courts in other jurisdictions began to
question whether accountants should have a special
rule protecting them against the results of their
negligence. Over the course of the next 45 years, a
handful of courts began to hold accountants liable
for negligence where the claimant, although not in
privity with the defendant accountant, was known
by the accountant to be relying upon his financial
report. These cases led to the adoption of Section
552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in 1977,
which proclaimed that persons whose reliance
upon an accountant’s report was specifically
foreseen by the accountant could assert a claim
against the accountant on a negligence theory.
Over the ensuing decade, the courts of several
states in dealing with this question began to adopt
the “Restatement approach,” finding it more in
tune with general notions of liability that every
person should be civilly responsible for any
damage which they caused through their own
negligence.

In 1983, the Supreme Court of New Jersey in
H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, went one step further
and held that an accountant could be held liable to
all persons whose reliance upon his report was
“reasonably foreseeable.” This decision drew
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heavily upon a law review article written by Judge Weiner and
upon the court’s (possibly mistaken) belief that accountants could
easily obtain insurance covering such claims so as to create a
system for compensating persons who relied upon erroneous
financial data. The New Jersey Court’s decision was followed
shortly thereafter by rulings in Wisconsin, California and Missis
sippi, all of which embraced the foreseeability standard enunci
ated in H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler.
Although several commentators quickly predicted that the
foreseeability standard was the wave of the future, most courts
which have been faced with this issue since H. Rosenblum, Inc. v.
Adler have refused to follow that decision. For example, in New
York, the Court of Appeals in Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur
Andersen & Co. expressly rejected the foreseeability standard and
adopted a “near privity rule” setting down three criteria for
determining whether a plaintiff is able to bring a claim against an
accountant on a negligence standard:

1.

The plaintiff did in fact rely upon the accountant’s report;

2.

The accountant knew that the plaintiff intended to rely upon
his report, and

3.

The accountant, through some actions on his own part, evi
denced his understanding of the plaintiff’s intended reliance.

Under the Credit Alliance standard, there is still the issue of
what constitutes evidence of the accountant’s knowledge of the
plaintiff’s intended reliance. While some federal courts have
been willing to find virtually any actions on the part of the
accountant to satisfy the third requirement of the Credit Alliance
test, the New York Court of Appeals itself has ruled that the
actions must be substantial and clearly evidence the accountant’s
understanding of the plaintiff’s intended reliance. In this connec
tion the Court of Appeals in William Iselin & Co. v. Mann Judd
Landau, held that mere telephone calls between the accountant
and the plaintiff which did not expressly deal with the plaintiff’s
intended reliance upon the accountant’s report, were not sufficient
to satisfy the third requirement under Credit Alliance.

The AICPA has been trying to promote the passage of
legislation in the various states adopting the Credit Alliance
formula. Although bills have been submitted to the legislatures of
numerous states, as of this writing, only four states have adopted
privity legislation: Illinois, Arkansas, Kansas and Utah. Under
these statutes, an accountant can only be held liable on a negli
gence standard to those persons whom he acknowledges in
writing are known to be relying upon his report. These statutes
require an affirmative statement by the accountant, and a failure
to so inform the client and/or the intended users leaves the
accountant vulnerable to a negligence suit by all foreseeable
users. To date, there has been only one case involving a privity
statute and there is no indication from that decision as to any
limitations of the statute.
The Credit Alliance and Restatement rules require that the

accountant actually know of the plaintiff’s
intended reliance upon his report. This criterion
raises the further question as to when the accoun
tant must possess that knowledge. This issue has
been dealt with by at least two courts, both of
which ruled that the accountant must have that
knowledge prior to the issuance of his report.

Since the Credit Alliance decision in 1986,
virtually every court that has been asked to decide
the scope of persons who can bring a negligence
claim against an accountant have opted for either
the Credit Alliance or Restatement rules. Al
though the privity and Restatement doctrines are
well established with respect to the accounting
profession, there have been a few cases in which
they were applied to lawyers and other profes
sionals. To be sure, there is a tendency on the part
of the courts to treat all professionals alike,
notwithstanding the fact that the entire privity
doctrine was established by the New York Court
of Appeals as a special rule for accountants.
At the time Chief Judge Cardozo rendered
his decision in the Ultramares case, he had
already gone on to reject the privity doctrine
with respect to product liability litigation. In
rendering his decision, he was concerned about
the open-ended nature of the liability faced by
accountants because of the generally widespread
reliance upon accountants’ reports. Although the
Ultramares decision was rendered two years
prior to the adoption of the Securities Act of
1933 (requiring accountants’ reports to be
included in prospectuses for all new issues of
securities), it was already clear that accountants’
reports were commonly relied upon by persons
other than the accountant’s client. Today,
reliance upon accountants’ reports is even more
widespread than it was in 1931, and certainly
more widespread than reliance upon the opin
ions and reports of other professionals. Not
withstanding this very essential difference, most
courts have applied the privity of Restatement
doctrines to claims against other professionals
without giving any apparent thought to the
relatively unique position of the accounting
profession. Instead, they have been more
concerned about applying a uniform rule for all
professionals.

Reliance and Causation Issues
One of the principal defenses relied upon by
accountants in professional liability claims is
that the plaintiff did not actually rely on the
accountant’s report. This defense was used
successfully for many years in class action
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litigation until the “fraud-on-the-market” theory gained accep
tance. Under the fraud-on-the-market theory, even if the plaintiff
does not actually see a copy of the accountant’s report, he is
nevertheless presumed to have relied upon that report if he relied
upon the integrity of the market price which was affected by that
report. Although the fraud-on-the-market theory has dubious
logical foundations, it has nevertheless been embraced by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, and by virtually
all of the U.S. Courts of Appeal.

The fraud-on-the-market doctrine merely creates a presump
tion which is rebuttable by the defendant’s proving any of the
following:
1.

The alleged misrepresentation did not lead to a distortion of
the market price;

2.

The plaintiff traded or would have traded despite his
knowing that the alleged misstatement was false;

3.

There was no efficient market in the subject securities; or

4.

The market in the subject securities was artificially affected
in the other direction by other false statements or rumors...

More recently, the plaintiffs’ bar has sought to apply the
fraud-on-the-market theory to claims based upon common law
fraud and ordinary negligence where the plaintiff cannot satisfy
his burden of proof that he in fact read and relied upon the
accountant’s report. These efforts have met with mixed success.
For example, in Mirkin v. Wasserman, a California appellate
court held that actual reliance was required in a negligence action
against an accountant, rejecting plaintiff’s attempt to invoke the
fraud-on-the-market doctrine. On the other hand, a federal
district court in California has held that the fraud-on-the-market
doctrine can be used to satisfy the reliance requirement of state
law claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation.
This issue generally arises in those jurisdictions in which
accountants can be held liable on a negligence standard to all
foreseeable users of their reports. In New Jersey, where the
foreseeability standard was first adopted, the courts have rejected
the fraud-on-the-market doctrine. This may be because the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Rosenblum v. Adler expressly stated that
the foreseeability rule would not open accountants to unlimited
liability since plaintiffs would still have to prove actual reliance. In
California, another foreseeability jurisdiction, however, the federal
courts have opted for fraud-on-the-market, while the lone state
court decision has rejected it for common law negligence claims.

In virtually all claims, including not only those brought
under the federal securities laws but also for common law
negligence, a plaintiff is required to prove that he reasonably
relied upon the accountant’s report. As a result, some accounting
firms, faced with liability claims based upon reports in a review
engagement have asserted as a defense that no reasonable person
would rely upon a review report in that the accountant does not
express an opinion on the financial statements of his client.
Indeed, in a review report the accountant expressly disclaims
offering any such opinion. Although the Supreme Court of at

least two states have rejected this theory, a recent
appellate court in the State of California (of all
places) did accept this argument in Union Bank
v. Ernst & Whinney. Unfortunately, the Califor
nia Supreme Court, in reviewing this decision,
“decertified” it which means that it may not be
relied upon as a precedent for deciding future
cases. The lesson of this decision seems to be
relatively clear; namely, although the courts will
seriously consider whether under the circum
stances the plaintiff could have reasonably relied
upon a review report, they will not adopt a hard
and fast rule which holds that reliance upon a
review report is per se unreasonable.

---------------EDITOR’S NOTE: ----------------

Recent favorable trends, perhaps best
exhibited by the California Supreme Court, have
limited the accountant’s liability to third party
claimants and struck down the so-called “unlim
ited liability exposure” of accountants.
Mr. Goldwasser is a Senior member of Veddor,
Price, Kaufman, Kammholz & Day, a New York
City Law Firm, which represents the New York
State Society of CPAs and approximately 110
CPA firms. Mr. Goldwasser is actively involved
in the development ofDefensive Loss Prevention
Techniques/Practices for CPAs. This article is
the last ofa series ofarticles that Mr. Goldwasser
has contributed to this newsletter, portions of
which may have previously appeared in other
periodicals or presentations by the author.

Rollins Burdick Hunter
Direct Group
is now

Aon Direct Group
If you call our “800 Telephone Number”
you will be greeted with “Aon Direct Group”
rather than “RBH Direct Group”.
As we have been part of Aon Corporation
for a number of years and we are separate and
distinct from our retail brokerage sister
company, Rollins Burdick Hunter, we have
changed our name.

Whether we answer the phone “Rollins
Burdick Hunter” or “Aon Direct Group” you
can expect to receive the same level of
service from the same professional staff that
has handled the AICPA Plan since 1974.
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What’s a CPA to do about

PRIVITY?
By Julia Winn
“Accounting is an art, not a science,” says Larry Wojcik, CPA
and partner with the law firm of Keck, Mahin & Cate. What
makes accounting an art, according to Wojcik, is that it requires a
great deal of professional judgment to estimate such future events
as possible losses on uncollectible receivables or excess and
obsolete inventories. No auditor can do enough testing to say with
100 percent certainty a client’s set of financial information is
accurate. “The best we can do is apply tests,” Wojcik says. “On
the basis of that testing and our professional experience we can
opine that the financial information is, in all material respects,
fairly stated.”
When something subsequently does go wrong, those who
suffer often attempt to seek redress through the courts. Unfortu
nately today’s society is litigation-happy. When a company goes
under, no matter what the cause, everyone (and their siblings)
jumps on the band-wagon. Accountants are increasingly being hit
with lawsuits from third parties with whom they had no contact or
relationship in connection with their audit engagement.

Illinois lawmakers listened when CPAs expressed fears that
the cost of an honest mistake on an audit would become so
expensive it would make accounting too dangerous a profession to
practice. In response to those fears, the legislature passed the
Privity Law in August 1986. In doing so Illinois became the first
state to legally limit accountants’ liability in negligence to unin
tended third party users through legislation. Many other states
have similar protection through well developed case law.
The first part of Public Act 84-1251 amended the Illinois
Public Accounting Act to say “no person, partnership or corpora
tion” licensed to practice public accountancy shall be held liable
for civil damages to persons “not in privity of contract” unless the
public accountant committed intentional fraud or misrepresented
the facts.

“Under the statute, it would appear these are
the only people who can sue you for negligence
under the circumstances,” Wojcik says.
“The up side in following such an approach is
that you have clearly expressed the intention to
limit liability,” says Robert Mednick, former chair
of the American Institute of CPAs subcommittee
on accountants’ legal liability.
“The down side,” he continues “occurs if the
client suddenly suggests you list all kinds of other
people as possible users. You could end up with a
list that includes people who, if you had not started
the process, wouldn’t have been in privity under
the basic law. As a result most large firms have
generally not adopted this practice to date.”

In terms of broaching the subject of a limiting
privity letter with the client, Wojcik says its
difficult to make a hard and fast rule. Based on
Wojcik’s experience with his clients he says it is
always a good idea to sit down with them and
explain the purpose of the letter before sending
something off.

WITH OUR COMPLIMENTS...
Please accept this complimentary issue of the
Accountants’ Liability Newsletter. The news
letter is a quarterly publication mailed as a
service to all AICPA Professional Liability Plan
insureds. It can help reduce liability exposure
and keep accountants up to date on current
industry trends.

The AICPA Plans provide insureds with:

In order to meet the privity requirements, accountants must
know at the time they do the audit who the principle users of the
audited statements are and how they intend to use the information.
“It’s almost a fundamental fairness,” explains Wojcik. “If I
know the ABC Bank or someone else is going to rely on my
financial statements for a specific purpose, I have the opportunity
to adjust my conduct accordingly. For instance, if I know a
company is going to buy my client’s business and the purchase
price will be determined on the basis of every dollar that is in
equity on the audited balance sheet, my materiality threshold
might change.”

•

Competitive Premium Rates

•

Low Premium financing rates for both
the Standard and Basic Plans.

•

The Standard Plan offers broad
coverage protection, a wide choice of
deductibles & coverage limits up to
$5,000,000.

•

The Basic Plan, designed for firms
with limited scope engagements, offers
low cost protection with a limit of
$100,000 and a deductible of $500.

For more information or an application call

A second part to the Privity Law permits the accountant to
further clarify who are considered in the privity with the accoun
tant. Written notification can be given to the client (as well as any
identified third parties) specifically listing those who are intended
users of the audited statements.

1-800-221-3023
or write:
Aon Direct Group, Inc.
AICPA Plan Administrator
4870 Street Road
Trevose, PA 19049
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“I think you should because you do not want to have any
adverse consequences on your client relationship by simply
sending the letter,” he explains. “The client might think they are
paying for one thing and you are putting a restriction on it.”
“In our experience we have found the clients are very under
standing because they have their own insurance problems. So they
understand the concern about cutting down your potential liability.”

“Also by having a frank discussion with the client, sometimes
you ferret out who are going to be the users of the financial
statement. This gets back to my premise that once you know who
will use the information you can adjust your conduct accordingly.”
Whether or not an accounting firm chooses to try to issue
limiting privity letters to its clients, it could still receive requests
from specific third-party lenders and others for an acknowledg
ment that they are intended users of the audit statements (called
reliance letters).
James Adler, a partner at Checkers, Simon & Rosner, says the
firm is very judicious on who they send such letters. “Every time
you send out a reliance letter you are putting your neck out to a
third party.”

“A reliance letter should be issued by an accounting firm only
when there is an understanding and mutual respect between a third
party creditor and a CPA firm, and the client needs such a letter in
order to enter into a credit arrangement with that third party.”

“Haphazardly providing these letters on demand is like
throwing $100 bills out the window on the grounds some of them
may stick to the window glass.”
Adler is also very careful about the wording of the letter. Each
one he sends is individually tailored to the particular circumstance
and individually written. “What I would want to ask that third
party is what steps are they taking with respect to this credit
decision? Their answer will tell me whether I should even give
them a reliance letter.”

“If I do, I may want to put in my letter all the
other steps the third party is performing so it is
clear to them and me I have established in writing
that I am not the only source of credit information
they are relying on, but that there are other sources
of information.”
“Creditors can flip a coin. If they make the
loan they either can make money on it or if they
don't they can sue the CPA. So they get it either
way. No way are they going to get that from me
under this privity law.”
“They are going to have to take responsibility
for their own credit decisions. And that is going to
be in my letter - that they have the ultimate
responsibility for making the credit decision and I
am just providing them with one piece of all the
information they are going to gather before
making the decision.”

As Wojcik says, to date no one has challenged
the privity law in court. That makes it very
difficult to say to CPAs if they should or should
not elect the option of sending a limiting privity
letter to their clients or if and how they should
respond to requests for reliance letters from third
party lenders and others. There is as yet no
judicial precedent and everything is fair game in a
court of law. As Mednick says, “It’s not an easy
call.”
Julia Winn is the Editor of “INSIGHT" a
periodical issued by the Illinois CPA Society.
Ms. Winn has granted us permission to reprint
several extremely informative articles in this
newsletter.

Underwriters Corner
The Underwriter’s Comer was developed as a service to provide
AICPA Plan Insureds with answers to frequently asked questions.
Should you have any questions which you would liked answered
in the publication, please address your questions to:

Michael J. Chovancak, Editor
AICPA Newsletter
c/o Aon Direct Group, Inc.
4870 Street Road
Trevose, PA 19049

room and receptionist. The sub-lessee will have a separate
incoming telephone line and the signs on the doors will clearly
indicate that they are a separate company. Will this arrangement
affect our AICPA Professional Liability Insurance Policy?

A.

Q. We wish to inform our insurance company of the fact that we
have subleased some of our office to another company which is
completely independent of our firm. This other company pro
vides general accounting services, including certified audits, to a
wide range of clients. We will be sharing a common reception

Please be advised that this space-sharing arrangement will
not effect your AICPA Professional Liability Insurance Policy.
Oftentimes, a crafty attorney will attempt to name “affiliated”
firms in lawsuits for malpractice. In order to aid in the defense
of such situations, we recommend that you and your suite-mate
stress to your respective clients each entity’s independence. By
using separate letterheads, telephone lines, door and building
signs you will further emphasize each firm’s independence to
both current and prospective clients thus, making the case for
your defense more clear-cut.
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Professional Liability/Litigation
Crisis — Recent Developments
Recently the CEOs of the six largest accounting firms
issued a joint statement of position entitled “The Liability
Crisis in the United States: Impact on the Accounting
Profession”.

Because of the importance and the length of the publica
tion we will print a portion of the statement in this issue
and the balance in the next issue of the AICPA Newsletter
for your review.
Additionally, the Board of Directors of the AICPA has
likewise issued a “Resolution on Legal Liability”, which
endorses the aforementioned statement of position and
urges necessary reform to abate the litigation crisis facing
the accounting profession.

The Liability Crisis In The United States:
Impact On The Accounting Profession
Introduction
The tort liability system in the United States is out of control.
It is no longer a balanced system that provides reasonable
compensation to victims by the responsible parties. Instead, it
functions primarily as a risk transfer scheme in which marginally
culpable or even innocent defendants too often must agree to
coerced settlements in order to avoid the threat of even higher
liability, pay judgments totally out of proportion to their degree of
fault, and incur substantial legal expenses to defend against
unwarranted lawsuits.
The flaws in the liability system are taking a severe toll on
the accounting profession. If these flaws are not corrected and the
tort system continues on its present inequitable course, the
consequences could prove fatal to accounting firms of all sizes.
But a liability system seriously lacking in logic, fairness and
balance is not just the accounting profession’s crisis. It is a
business crisis and a national crisis.

This position statement describes these matters in more
detail, as well as needed reforms that the American Institute of
CPAs (AICPA) and the six largest accounting firms are advocat
ing. In seeking these reforms, the firms are not attempting to
avoid liability where they are culpable. Rather, the firms seek
equitable treatment that will permit them and the public account
ing profession to continue to make an important contribution to
the U.S. economy.

An Epidemic of Litigation
The present liability system has produced an epidemic of
litigation that is spreading throughout the accounting profession
and the business community. It is threatening the independent audit
function and the financial reporting system, the strength of U. S.
capital markets, and the competitiveness of the U. S. economy.

The principal causes of the accounting
profession’s liability problems are unwarranted
litigation and coerced settlements. The present
system makes it both easy and financially
rewarding to file claims regardless of the merits
of the case. As former SEC Commissioner
Philip Lochner recently pointed out in The Wall
Street Journal, plaintiffs may simply be seeking
to recoup losses from a poor investment decision
by going after the most convenient “deep
pocket” - the auditor. In too many cases,
moreover, claims are filed with the sole intent of
taking advantage of the system to force defen
dants to settle.
The doctrine of joint and several liability
makes each defendant fully liable for all assessed
damages in a case, regardless of the degree of
fault. In practical terms this means that, even
with no evidence of culpability, a company’s
independent auditors are almost certain to be
named in any action filed against that company
alleging financial fraud, for no reason other than
the auditors’ perceived “deep pockets” or
because they are the only potential defendant
that is still solvent. A particularly egregious
example of the abuses encouraged by joint and
several liability is the common practice of
plaintiffs’ attorneys settling with the prime
wrongdoers, who don’t have a defense or
money, at a fraction of what these parties should
pay. The attorneys then pursue the case against
the “deep pocket” professionals, who as a result
of joint and several liability are exposed for 100
percent of the damages even if found to be only
one percent at fault.

Other elements in the system also act as
incentives for unwarranted litigation leading to
forced settlements. For example, American
judicial rules make no effective provision for
recovery of legal costs by prevailing defendants,
even if the plaintiff’s case is meritless. In
addition, judicial restrictions on the types of
cases in which punitive damages may be
awarded have been significantly relaxed in
recent years, making solvent professional and
business defendants a prime target. The prospect
of having to pay all damages as a consequence
of joint and several liability, the high costs of
defense, and possible punitive damages are
persuasive factors in coercing settlements.

Abusive and unwarranted litigation is a
problem not just for the accounting profession,
but for business and the economy generally. A
small group of attorneys is reaping millions of
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dollars by bringing federal securities fraud claims (under SEC
Rule 10B-5) against public companies whose only crime has
been a fluctuation in their stock price. These attorneys use the
threat of enormous legal costs, a lengthy and disruptive discovery
process, protracted litigation, and damage to reputation to force
large settlements.

ventures in their efforts to raise capital and also
impacts local, national and global businesses;
and

The CEO of a high tech company that has been the target of
13 specious Rule 10b-5 suits calls these actions “legalized
extortion” and their effects go far beyond the “payoffs” de
manded. These meritless suits siphon off funds needed for
research and development, capital investment, growth and
expansion. They divert management’s time, talent and energy
from the principal mission of running the business. They send
liability insurance premiums skyrocketing. Ultimately, the direct
and indirect costs of these suits are borne by shareholders, along
with employees, customers, and all of a company’s stakeholders.

WHEREAS: The accounting profession as
a whole faces thousands of lawsuits claiming
many billions of dollars in damages, far exceed
ing its proportionate share of responsibility; and

Joint and several liability encourages the inclusion of “deep
pocket” defendants such as independent accountants, lawyers,
directors and underwriters in these suits in order to increase the
prospect and size of settlements. Prohibitive legal costs, the
unpredictable outcome of a jury trial, and the risk of being liable
for the full damages compel even blameless defendants to race
each other to the settlement table. And they do this despite the
realization that, to the uninformed public, “agreeing” to settle is
seen as an admission of wrongdoing.

WHEREAS: Litigation claims against
other firms rose by two-thirds between 1987 and
1991 and 40% are “going bare” in light of the
cost of liability insurance; and

A survey by the six largest accounting firms of the cases
against them involving 10b-5 claims which were concluded in
fiscal year 1991 showed that: (i) the average claim subjecting the
accounting firm to joint and several liability was for $85 million;
(ii) the average settlement by the firm was $2.7 million, suggest
ing there might have been little or no merit to the original claim
against the accountant; yet, (iii) the average legal cost per claim
was $3.5 million. It is not surprising that an accounting firm
would agree to settle a case for less than what it had already spent
in legal fees and, therefore, avoid the risk of liability of over
twenty times the settlement by a jury that may be hostile to a
business with “deep pockets”. However, controlling risk by
settling where you did nothing wrong becomes a very expensive
strategy for “winning” the liability game.

The above represents the first part of a two-part statement of
position issued by Arthur Anderson & Company, Coopers &
Lybrand, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG Peat
Marwick, and Price Waterhouse.

AICPA
Board Of Directors’
Resolution On Legal Liability
WHEREAS: The AICPA, on behalf of the entire accounting
profession, has been seeking judicial and legislative reforms
responsive to the liability crisis affecting the United States; and

WHEREAS: Unwarranted litigation affects new business

WHEREAS: The cost of litigation ulti
mately is passed on to the general public; and

WHEREAS: In 1991. the six largest firms
spent $477 million on legal matters — 9% of
their domestic auditing and accounting revenues
and an 18% increase over 1990 litigation costs;
and

WHEREAS: A growing number of firms
are avoiding “high-risk” audit clients and even
whole industries and some small firms are
dropping public clients or abandoning their
auditing practices altogether; therefore

BE IT RESOLVED: That the board of
directors of the American Institute of CPAs
endorses the position paper issued by the six
largest accounting firms, The Liability Crisis in
the United States: Impact on the Accounting
Profession. The board believes the paper fairly
reflects the nature of the litigation crisis in this
country and appropriately emphasizes that in
seeking litigation reform the profession is not
attempting to avoid responsibility where
accountants have breached their duty; and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED: That the
AICPA believes reform of the federal securities
laws is essential to curb unwarranted litigation
and would be an important first step toward
instituting broader liability reforms; and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED: That the
AICPA also commends the work being done at
the state level to reform state liability laws
through legislative and judicial initiatives and to
remove harmful regulatory and professional
restrictions. The profession’s ability to meet
public expectations would be greatly enhanced
by exploring all possible alternatives for
reducing the threat unwarranted liability poses to
the entire profession.
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‘We’ll be there...
Do you have questions about your accountants professional liability insurance? If so, members of the underwriting unit of the AICPA Plan
are tentatively scheduled to be at the following AICPA and/or State CPA Society meetings to answer your questions. Please come over to
our booth and visit!!
SHOW

LOCATION

AICPA PCPS Conference

Loews Coronado Bay, San Diego, CA

May 2-5,1993

New York Accounting Show

New York City Hilton Hotel, New York, NY

May 2-5,1993

California Computer Show

LAX Hilton Hotel, Los Angeles, CA

June 8 -10,1993

FICPA (Florida)
Southeast Accounting Show

Omni International Hotel, Orlando, Florida

June 10 -11,1993

AICPA Micro Computer
Conference and Exhibition

Sheraton Boston, Boston, MA

June 13-16,1993

Michigan Society of CPA's
Management Information Show

Hyatt Regency, Dearborn, Ml

June 28 - 30,1993

DATES

7.10% Premium Finance Rate For 1993!
AICPA Professional
Liability Insurance Plan Committee
Leonard Dopkins, Chairman
Dopkins & Company, Buffalo, NY
Benjamin E. Cohen
Blum, Shapiro & Company, P.C. West Hartford, CT
James Erickson
Moss Adams, San Francisco, CA
Rex Harper
Harper, Van Scoik & Company, Clearwater, FL
Donald A. Harris
Gerald T. Stack & Associates, Casper WY

Steve Kaufman
Reznick, Fedder & Silverman CPAs, P.C. Bethesda, MD
Charles L. Spicer
Condley & Company, Abilene, TX

Staff Aide: William C. Tamulinas
Plan Administrator: Aon Direct Group, Inc.
C. J. Reid, Jr.; Robert M. Parker
Plan Underwriter: Crum & Forster Managers Corp. (ILL.)
F. Kyle Nieman; Robert S. Knowles
Newsletter Editor: Michael J. Chovancak

The Accountants’ Liability Newsletter is a quarterly publication mailed as a complimentary service to all AICPA Professional Liability Plan insureds.
The contents of this newsletter do not represent an official position of the AICPA Professional Liability Insurance Plan Committee.

AICPA Professional Liability
Insurance Plan Committee
c/o Newsletter Editor
Aon Direct Group, Inc.
4870 Street Road
Trevose, PA 19049
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